Born: (between) 01 January 1979 to 31 December 1981;

Place of Birth: Saudi Arabia;

Nationality: Qatar; alt. Saudi Arabia;

Passport No.: 592667 (Qatar) issued 03 May 2007;

Activities:

Hababi, wears multiple hats for al Qaeda. And the government’s dossier for him demonstrates that there is no firm dividing line between the jihadists’ insurgency operations in South Asia and their plotting terrorist attacks in the West.

In his “key leadership role,” Hababi “is responsible for planning attacks against US and Coalition forces in Afghanistan, contributing to al Qaeda’s external operations planning, and fundraising on al Qaeda’s behalf.” External operations means terrorist plots in the West or against Western interests as “revenge for the deaths of senior al Qaeda leaders.”

In 2009, “he led operations in northeast Afghanistan that included attacks against US military bases.” Hababi “participated in two attacks against Coalition Forces convoys” the following year. He has also overseen the acquisition of weapons, “including rocket propelled grenades,” for distribution to jihadists in Afghanistan.

Since 2010, he has helped raise funds and also had a say in “authorizing spending on behalf of al Qaeda.” He has been “consulting on al Qaeda operations worldwide” since 2011.

As of 2012, according to Treasury, Hababi “solicited funds from supporters in Gulf countries to support al Qaeda’s external operations and also expected to receive funds from Gulf-based donors for activities in Afghanistan.”

In early 2013, Hababi “and his battalion intended to take control of Kunar Province, Afghanistan and establish a base to launch external operations on behalf of al Qaeda.”

As of 2015, he has been the “emir for the Eastern Zone of Afghanistan” and, in that capacity, has been “responsible for finding a new sanctuary for al Qaeda.”

He “worked on attack plans for fighting in northeast Afghanistan” in 2015 and “has been in charge of al Qaeda-sponsored training in northeast Afghanistan” for several years. In addition, Hababi “directed the delivery of funds and weapons to Taliban associates in Afghanistan for use in future attacks.”

Discussed in Osama bin Laden’s files: Hababi’s importance to al Qaeda can be seen in declassified files recovered during the raid on Osama bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan in May 2011. In a memo to bin Laden dated June 19, 2010, (“Memo to bin Laden dated June 19, 2010”) for example, Atiyah Abd al Rahman heaped praise on Hababi. (See LWJ report, Osama Bin Laden’s Files: ‘Very strong military activity in Afghanistan.’)

As I have reported before, we have a good battalion over there (Afghanistan) led by brother Faruq al Qatari,” Rahman wrote, referring to Hababi by his nom de guerre. “He is the best of a good crew,” Rahman continued. “He recently sent us a message telling us that he has arranged everything to receive us; he said the locations are good, there are supporters and everything.” Rahman’s memo shows, therefore, that Hababi has been deeply involved in the relocation of al Qaeda cadres from northern Pakistan into Afghanistan for several years.

Another missive found in Osama bin Laden’s lair also includes a discussion of the move back into Afghanistan. In a letter dated Oct. 21, 2010, bin Laden told Rahman, who ironically was subsequently killed in a US drone strike, that al Qaeda should relocate as many “brothers” as possible to the eastern Afghan provinces of Nuristan, Kunar, Ghazni and Zabul to avoid the US drone campaign in North and South Waziristan.

Bin Laden knew that Hababi had cleared the way for his al Qaeda comrades to live and fight in Afghanistan. And Hababi continues to wage jihad there, while plotting terror around the world, to this day.