The pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian connection with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Syria
In December 2020, the Indonesian anti-terror police unit, Detachment 88, revealed that the local Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) terrorist group had sent scores of its members to train and fight in Syria.
A total of 96 operatives, mostly young and fresh recruits, had undergone a six-month pre-deployment training program at around 12 JI training sites in Central Java from 2012 to 2018.
Around 66 of them eventually made their way to Syria, the majority of whom joined Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), Al Qaeda’s former Syrian offshoot, which was then known as the Nusra Front, or Jabhat al-Nusra in Arabic.
Evidence suggests that Indonesian jihadist links to Al Qaeda in Syria go beyond HTS and is not limited to the supply of jihadi recruits.
It has also involved the delivery of funding by informal Indonesian charities to HTS and other pro-Al Qaeda militant groups in Syria, including Huras ad-Din (HaD) and Malhama Tactical.
However, unlike an expanding body of research that assesses Indonesian groups affiliated to the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group, studies on the involvement of pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian jihadists in the Syrian conflict have been piecemeal.
This article examines the nature and extent of existing ties between Al Qaeda-linked groups in Indonesia and Syria as well as their attendant security implications for Indonesia.
The involvement of Indonesian jihadists in the Syrian theater dates to the early years of the country’s ongoing civil war.
Initially, JI members started travelling to Syria to train and fight alongside anti-government militant groups, in particular Nusra Front, which entered the Syrian war as an extension of Al Qaeda in 2012.
The Nusra Front swore allegiance to Al Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri a year later. The emergence of IS in 2014 and its subsequent rivalry with Al Qaeda for leadership of the global jihadist landscape, led to a fracturing within the Indonesian militant networks, with various Indonesian groups switching allegiance to then IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Most notably, JI’s founder and former leader, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, defected to IS in 2014 in a surprise move.
However, JI’s main core has remained loyal to Al Qaeda, even when IS’ dominance over the threat landscape was at its peak.
As elaborated in this paper, JI along with other like-minded militant groups such as Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahidin Council/MMI), have continued to align with the Nusra Front and its successor HTS, while providing manpower and rhetorical support.
The pro-HTS support from Indonesia has also involved informal charity groups, which have collected and disbursed money in Syria. At least one of these groups has the publicly declared aim of supporting HTS’ military needs.
Several informal charity organizations in Indonesia have also undertaken philanthropic campaigns in support of civilian victims of the civil war in Syria.
While most charities pursue legitimate work, some have partaken in a mixture of humanitarian relief and militant-supporting activities.
One such non-governmental Indonesian charity, Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), is known to have delivered medical aid to conflict-affected civilian populations in various areas controlled by Nusra Front in the Syrian provinces of Latakia and Idlib between 2012 to 2014.
There have been official allegations that HASI was operating as the humanitarian wing of JI. It reportedly raised funds to support Nusra Front in Syria and facilitated the travels of JI cadres from Indonesia to join the group.
Similarly, from 2018 to 2019, Abu Ahmed Foundation (AAF) had reportedly disbursed aid for refugees in Syria, while simultaneously allocating an unspecified amount of funds to support HTS’ fighters “performing ribath (frontline guard) duties” as well as Malhama Tactical, a Chechen-led jihadist training unit within HTS.
This is evident from multiple requests for donations and confirmations of funds delivery that AAF posted online in the form of explicit statements.
Founded by a British national named Tazneen Miriam Sailar alias Ummu Yasmin, whose Indonesian JI member husband was Acep Ahmad Setiawan, alias the aforementioned Abu Ahmad Al-Indunisy, AAF’s Indonesian Syria-based personnel also routinely posted HTS’ related news, statements, and operational updates in its Telegram channels.
It encouraged followers to commit “jihad by assets,” by donating funds to assist HTS fighters and refugees residing in the HTS-controlled territories in Syria via AAF.
Given the Syrian civil war shows little signs of abating, and HTS is poised to continue ruling over major swathes of Idlib as a “legitimate” armed opposition group, the group may benefit directly or indirectly from informal humanitarian organizations operating in its territories.
A February 2021 UN report alleged that it is likely that a portion of the charity funds meant for the civilian population might have gone into HTS’ coffers, as the latter has monopolized the supervision of the distribution of humanitarian aid in the territories under its control in Idlib via its Maktab Sho’oun Al-Munathamat (the Bureau of Organization Affairs).
In turn, this has left limited opportunity for charities to deliver aid directly and independently to needy civilian populations. Maktab Sho’oun Al-Munathamat has also reportedly diverted portions of aid to fund HTS patronage activities.
Terrorists’ abuse of charity funds is not a rare phenomenon. For instance, HTS and its predecessor Nusra Front had previously also received financial aid from charity groups in the UK and Australia, among others.
HTS is assessed to be relatively self-sufficient in terms of its financing needs. Due to its ability to control territory and key trade routes in parts of Syria, it reportedly generates about $13 million in local revenue per month.
However, it is impossible to accurately gauge the extent of funds coming from external informal charities, that then flow into HTS’ coffers.
Even if this constitutes an insignificant amount, the group will likely continue to rely on such funds as an alternative financial source.
Moreover, such funds may serve as a morale booster for HTS symbolizing the significant external sympathy that persists for the group’s cause.
Despite ongoing support in the above-mentioned dimensions, the relationship between Indonesian militant groups and HTS has not evolved to such an extent that it mirrors the networking between IS and other Southeast Asian groups, the latter of which has posed the primary security threat to Indonesia and around Southeast Asia in recent years.
Two factors potentially contribute to the low-profile nature of the relationship: the first relates to pro-Al Qaeda Indonesian groups’ commitment to temporarily stay away from committing violence inside the country; the second concerns HTS’ Syria-focused agenda.
The Indonesian groups that support Al-Qaeda’s stance in rejecting IS — JI, MMI, and Jamaah Anshorusy Syariah (JAS) — have participated in the democratic process (i.e., rallies and urging their supporters to not vote for a certain candidate during an election period) and not conducted an attack in the country for more than a decade.
At the same time, the fact that these groups have sent fighters to Syria for arms training, signals a manifestation of i’dad (preparation for jihad).
On its part, HTS has kept a low profile outside the Syrian battlefield, while appearing reluctant to call for or carry out international terrorist attacks.
By publicly disassociating itself from Al Qaeda and apparently not prioritizing carrying out attacks outside of Syria, HTS has attempted to portray itself as a Syria-focused legitimate insurgent organization, rather than a terrorist one.
In this respect, HTS’ stance differs markedly from IS’ focus on waging a transnational armed campaign, which has manifested in the series of attacks and plots that IS has directed and inspired globally in recent years.
It is also notable that unlike IS, which has usually sought and managed to exert a certain level of strategic and operational control and influence over its affiliates across the world, the linkages between HTS and Indonesian jihadists have been built on more equitable terms.
This is partly attributed to JI, MMI and HTS, like any other groups within the Al Qaeda network, not having any hierarchical authority over each other.
It is significant that this horizontal relationship has largely been one-sided (one-way, unilateral) — it is Indonesian jihadists that have usually offered and provided various forms of support to HTS.
Source: MEI
