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Quds Force & IRGC’s Intelligence Organization – the originators of terrorism

September 15, 2022 » Terror Leaks » /

Article RadarTHIS ARTICLE CONNECT:

 Affected Countries: iran; united-states; syria; lebanon; iraq;

Quds Force & IRGC’s Intelligence Organization – the originators of terrorism:

Quds Force:

Quds Force was formally founded in 1988 after the IRGC’s reorganization, post the Iran – Iraq war (it operated some years before and during the war in different formats – department 900 and Special External Operations). It is a special-operations branch within the IRGC. It is responsible for carrying out Iranian regional policies. In fact, it specializes in unconventional warfare and military intelligence operations which are fundamental to conducting terrorist attacks.

Quds Force is a completely independent structure within the IRGC, most of its units are clandestine, and the Quds Force commander reports directly to Khamenei, bypassing the formal chain of command.

Quds Force operates against western targets, and against opposition activists living outside Iran.

Quds Force units operate across the globe, focusing on the Middle East region. Quds forces are divided into the main HQ with the special units and several regional HQ scattered throughout the continents. It cooperates with proxy and client terror organizations and entities such as: Hezbollah, Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, and Shiite networks (Pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and Shiite cells in Africa).

Quds Force provide the proxies with financing, training, weapons, technological equipment, intelligence, and command, tailored for each proxy.

Quds Force is also responsible for the operational connections with Iran-friendly countries that support terrorism such as: Syria, Venezuela, and North Korea.

Quds Force manages close relations with various Mafia syndicates, especially in Turkey, the Caucasus, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, and the Balkan.

Hitherto only three consecutive commanders headed Quds Force:

• Ahmad Vahidi (88’-98’, the current Minister of Interior)
• Qassem Soleimani (98’-2020, killed January,2020 by a US airstrike)
• Esmail Qaani (2020-present)

IRGC’S Intelligence Organization:

IRGC’s Intelligence Organization is an Iranian intelligence agency which is part of Iran’s intelligence community. It operates independently from the MOIS and has a permanent seat in the Council for Intelligence Coordination. The Intelligence Organization of IRGC (in its current form) was established on Khamenei’s initiative in 2009, and it answers directly and only to him. It was formed that way to prevent disagreements and bureaucracy between the elite of the political level and MOIS to Khamenei (which harmed MOIS’s status). Furthermore, to strengthen the lines even more, in May 2019 the Intelligence Organization was merged with the Strategic Intelligence branch of the IRGC.

IRGC’s Intelligence Organization deals with special operations, thwarting political subversion, actively participating in repression of protests and riots and fighting “Western cultural penetration”. In recent years, the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization assigned missions which were previously classified as operational MIOS tasks, e.g.: capturing regime opponents abroad, arresting tourists and dual-nationality Iranians for the purpose of prisoner swap deals with Western countries, or for advancing various economic interests. This amounts to terrorism.

Today, the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization is “competing” with Quds Force for different missions abroad. Both have the operational capability of gathering intelligence and to carry out special operations. On the other hand, a few testimonies show that cooperation between the two does exists in operations outside Iran, although the way it is divided and managed is not clear yet.
Hitherto only two consecutive commanders headed IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (in its current structure):

• Hussein Taeb (2009-2022, today’s special advisor to IRGC’s commander Hossein Salami).
• Muhammad Kazemi (2022-present)

These units function as the main executors of the Iranian regime’s terrorist policy around the world.

Quds Force’s Special Units:

Unit 400:
Unit 400, also known as the “Special Operations Unit”, is the most elite unit of Quds Force. It operates outside of Iran’s boundaries. Its mission is to carry out terror operations against western targets. This unit is meant to do special missions that Quds Force wants to do itself without “taking a risk” on local cells that are less professional. It is staffed with highly trained personnel for various operational situations.

The unit is responsible for assassinations, kidnaping and sabotage.

The unit works closely with Hezbollah’s elite unit 910, which serves the same purposes.

Unit 840:
Unit 840 is one of Quds Force’s elite and classified units.

This unit branched in the recent years from unit 400 (highly trained assassination unit) and it’s in charge of establishing terror cells in foreign countries and using them mainly to carry out terror operations (kidnap or assassination) against western targets and Iranian opposition activists. Those local cells are usually part of/connected to the local organized crime scene in the country of the operation.

The unit’s main departments are: Headquarters, Intelligence, Middle East and Africa, Caucasus and Asia, Europe and the US, and an operational department specializing in activity against opposition activists.

Unit 840 carried out terrorist operations in various countries around the world with the goal to assassinate figures associated with the Iranian regime’s opposition. Among them are assassinations of opposition activists in the Netherlands and Turkey, and failed assassination attempts in the US and Azerbaijan.

Recently, the unit used operatives from Iraq, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Iranians that live in European countries to carry out their terror operations.

Unit 190:
Unit 190 is Quds Force’s special unit for logistics operations. It is responsible for transferring and smuggling Iranian weapons and operatives around the world.

The unit was responsible for the transfer of tens of thousands of tons of weapons in recent years to proxy terror organizations, ethnic groups and countries, in accordance with Iran’s interests, mainly: Hezbollah, the Assad regime in Syria, Houthis, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas Shiite militias in Iraq and more.

The modus operandi of the unit includes the use of cargo airplanes and cargo ship, civilian transportation for concealment (airplanes, ship, trucks), transfer of weapons through third countries, send it with false paperwork guised as humanitarian aid, and hide it inside containers with legitimate products.

A significant part of the unit’s personnel are pilots who work under the cover of one of the Iranian airlines, with the aim of deceiving the west and to conceal them. The plane is packed with tons of weapons or operatives who want to reach the same destination without any documentation.

Unit 340:
The technological R&D unit of Quds Force. Most of the unit’s employees are mechanical engineering experts who are assisted by a series of engine and missile production facilities in the Tehran and Samnan area for production, research, training, and system testing.

In addition to the development of rockets, the unit provides training and technical support to terrorist organizations backed by it, mainly Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad, the Iraqi militias and the Houthis in Yemen. The technical support is intended to allow those organizations the ability to self-produce rockets. The briefings and training in Iran are carried out at the “Shahid Shabani” training center and at the shooting test ranges of the Space Research Center at the Samnan site.

Among the developments that came out of the technical unit’s planning table were heavy rockets which were seen in the arena of Iraq, Syria and recently also in the Gaza arena. These rockets carry an especially large warhead for a larger radius of destruction and heavy damage in urban areas.

IRGC’s Intelligence Organization Special Units:

IRGC’s Intelligence Organization’s units carry out terror attacks around the world, very much like Units 400 and 840, or at least tries to do so (recently many of its more qualified personal were dismissed/moved to Quds Force leaving the unit with untrained operatives failing their missions).

The organization comprises various divisions, and uses multiple means for pursuing terror attacks, including a network of military attachés around the world.

Division 4000: Special Operations Division
This division is responsible for special activity against western targets with a special focus on Israelis, and Iranian opposition activists.

Responsible for the last months operational failures trying to kidnap and assassinate western targets, and in particular Israelis, mainly in Turkey.

More recent failures were in Cyprus, UAE, and Uganda.

Division 1500: Counterespionage Division
Division 800: Foreign Intelligence Division
Division 2000: Cyber Division





Examples of Terror operations carried out, supervised, and directed by Quds Force or IRGC’s Intelligence Organization as part of the Iranian regime’s modus operandi:


Completed terror operations:

Bethesda, Maryland (July,1980) – The assassination of the former Iranian diplomat Ali Akbar Tabatabai. Iranian agents recruited David Belfield (aka Dawud Salahuddin), an American convert to Shiia Islam to be the one who pulled the trigger.

Beirut, Lebanon (October,1983) – A terror attack “Barracks bombing” in two compounds of the US army and French army in Beirut in a matter of minutes. The suicide bomber, who drove the first truck into the US army compound, was an Iranian national named Ismail Ascari. He detonated with his 9,525 kilograms of TNT. 305 people were killed in the two explosions. The terror attack was carried out mainly by Hezbollah and was supervised and directed by the top command of the Iranian regime.

Paris, France (August,1991) – The assassination of Chapour Bakhtiar, a former Iranian prime minister (the last one before the revolution in 1979). He and his personal secretary were stabbed to death with kitchen knives in Bakhtiar’s apartment.

Buenos Aires, Argentina (March,1992) – A terror attack on the Israeli embassy. A pick-up truck driven by a suicide bomber and loaded with explosives smashed into the front entrance of the Israeli Embassy and detonated. The embassy, a Catholic church, and a nearby school building were destroyed. The blast killed 29 people, including children, and wounded 242. The operation was carried out by Hezbollah’s special unit 910 but was supervised and directed by Iran’s top command that gave the mission a diplomatic cover for all the operational needs of the squad.

Berlin, Germany (September,1992) – The assassination of Sadegh Sharafkandi in Mykonos restaurant. He was a Kurdish political activist and the Secretary General of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (PDKI) He was shot dead with three more people accompanying him.

Buenos Aires, Argentina (July,1994) – A terror attack on the Jewish community center – AMIA. The car bomb, a van loaded with about 275 kilograms of ammonium nitrate, drove into the AMIA building and detonated. The blast killed 85 people and wounded over 300. Same as in the terror attack in 1992, the operation was carried out by Hezbollah’s Special unit 910 but supervised and directed by the top command of the Iranian regime and with his diplomatic cover for all the operational needs of the operational unit. It is still considered one of the significant terror attacks in history.

Khobar, Saudi Arabia (June,1996) – A terror attack next to Aramco’s HQ in an 8-floor building, containing the US air-force command post. A truck full of explosives detonated and killed 19 US air force personnel and wounded 498 from different nationalities. Iran directed the attack and carried it out by various proxies incl. Hezbollah. Later, Iran tried to blame Al Qaeda for this action.

New Delhi, India (February,2012) – Quds Force’s operative riding a motorcycle attached a sticky bomb on the car of Israel’s defense ministry official. His wife was driving it that day and was injured by the explosion.

Burgas, Bulgaria (July,2012) – A terror attack carried out by a suicide bomber inside a tourist bus with mainly Israelis, inside the area of Burgas airport. 6 people were killed and over 30 were injured. The attack was supervised and directed by the top command of the Iranian regime and was carried out by Hezbollah’s squad.

The Hague, Netherlands (November,2017) – The assassination of Ahmad Mola Nissi, an Iranian Arab activist who founded an Arab nationalist group aspired to establish an independent state inside Iran. He was shot in the street.


Foiled terror operations:

Washington DC, USA (October,2011) – U.S. authorities revealed they had foiled a plot allegedly orchestrated by the Iranian government to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States. The two Iranian were caught, Manssor Arbabsiar, a naturalized US citizen who holds an Iranian passport, and Gholam Shakuri, an Iranian-based member of Quds force.

Baku, Azerbaijan (January,2012) – Three Azeri assets of Quds Force were detained while carrying explosives and firearms with the intention to assassinate the Israeli ambassador in the country, the Jewish community’s rabbi and the Jewish school principal.

Tbilisi, Georgia (February,2012) – Quds Force operative attached a sticky bomb underneath the car of an Israeli official in the country. It was discovered by his driver.

Bangkok, Thailand (February,2012) – Quds Force operatives planned to attach a sticky bomb to a car of an Israeli official in the country. One operative had a self-inflicted accident with the explosives in his safe house, he was badly injured. The other operative had a fight with a taxi driver after he refused to give him a ride. The Iranian threw a grenade at the taxi and one more towards policemen who approached the place to arrest him. The second grenade hit a tree and bounced back to the Iranian’s legs and ripped them off.

Montevideo, Uruguay (January,2015) – The Israeli embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay appeared to be the target of an attempted bombing. A small explosion occurred near a trade center building housing the Israeli embassy. Police found a partially detonated device allegedly connected to someone at the Iranian embassy. A senior Iranian diplomat was expelled in April 2015 for alleged involvement in the plot.

Tirana, Albania (March,2018) – MEK members in Albania were targeted by Quds Force unit 840 and their local assets, as targets for assassination. The local police detained few members of the local team.

Pretoria, South Africa (September,2020) – The US and the South African Intelligence services exposed Quds Force’s plot to assassinate Mrs. Lana Marks, the US ambassador to the country. She was targeted due to her friendship with Donald Trump to revenge Qassem Soleimani’s death.

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, (February,2021) – Ethiopian authorities arrested 15 people who were involved in plotting a terror attack against the local UAE’s embassy. They were captured with weapons and explosives. It was a local cell directed by Quds force unit.

Istanbul, Turkey (June,2022) – Several Iranian squads were arrested after a row of attempts to kidnap or kill Israelis in the Turkish capital. Most of them were planned by the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization.

Stockholm, Sweden (August,2022) – A bag with explosives was found in a park in city center before a concert held there by the Iranian singer Ibrahim Hamadi aka “Abi” – who opposes the regime in Tehran and lives in exile.

Quds Force’s weapon smuggling routes:

In the last decade or so, the number of arms shipments to Quds Force proxies and allies in the Middle East has increased significantly. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, Syria has become a favorite destination for the supply of Iranian weapons, which are mostly intended for Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Houthis in Yemen are also a major destination for these arms shipments.

The weapons are smuggled in different routes by sea, air, and land. Here are some examples:

GFATF-LLL-Quds-Force-IRGC-Intelligence-Organization-the-originators-of-terrorism-weapons-are-smuggled 1

GFATF-LLL-Quds-Force-IRGC-Intelligence-Organization-the-originators-of-terrorism-weapons-are-smuggled 5


The terrorists of Quds Force and IRGC’s Intelligence Organization:

Quds Force:

GFATF - LLL - Esmail Qaani 2
Name: Esmail Qaani (1957)

Position: Head of Quds Force (replaced Qassem Soleimani after his death, January 2020).

Background: Serves in the IRGC since the 80’s. In his early years in Quds Force, he was appointed to the eastern border of Iran, fighting the Taliban and their control of drug smuggling. Qaani oversaw financial disbursements to terror organizations around the world, including Hezbollah.
He was Soleimani’s deputy since 1997. He does not have a charismatic character like Soleimani, and it is common rumor that he received his position due to respect to Soleimani who recommended him for this position.


GFATF - LLL - Mohammad Reza
Name: Mohammad Reza Fallahzadeh aka Abu-Bakr (1962)

Position: Deputy commander of Quds Force.

Background: Prior to this role he was Quds Force’s deputy for coordination affairs.
From 2007 – 2013 he served in Syria and was promoted to the status of the local deputy of operations of Quds Force there.


GFATF - LLL - Hassan Polark 2
Name: Hassan Polark

Position: Special adviser to the commander of Quds Force and member of Quds Force’s Command Council. Supervisor of the Quds Force headquarters’ projects – reports to Khamenei.


GFATF - LLL - Hamed Abdallahi
Name: Hamed Abdallahi

Position: Commander of unit 400, the elite unit of Qods Force. He serves at this position approximately for a decade.

Background: Before his appointment as Unit 400 commander, Abdallahi served in various positions in the IRGC and the Quds Force, including: commander of the Zahedan and Zabul area within the IRGC, deputy to Qassem Soleimani when the latter was commander of the 41st Division, and head of the Quds Force intelligence branch.

Abdallahi was personally involved in carrying out terror attacks along his career.
As head of Unit 400, Abdallahi is involved in all its activities, approving attacks from inception to execution, including collection of intelligence, operational planning, final approval, and operational considerations, following attacks.


GFATF - LLL - Majid Alavi
Name: Majid Alavi (1957) whose real name is Mohammad Pour Naimi

Position: Deputy commander to Hamed Abdallahi in unit 400, the elite unit of Quds Force.

Background: Prior to this role he was head of the foreign intelligence division in MOIS and later appointed to acting intelligence minister in parallel.
In unit 400 he had command in many operations around the world, including a series of terror attacks against Israelis in 2012.
Majid is involved deeply in various IRGC projects in Syria, where he used to visit very often.
He is one of the masterminds behind the unit’s missions and he oversees the unit’s cooperations with terror organizations around the world.


GFATF - LLL - Abdolreza Shahlaei
Name: Abdolreza Shahlaei

Position: Quds Force’s commander in Yemen (unit 400).

Background: He oversees the strong connection with the Houthis, including weapon supply, training, intelligence gathering and operations. On the night of the US airstrike to eliminate Soleimani, Shahlaei was the second target with an airstrike in Yemen around the same time, but he escaped in time.
He has a long history of targeting Americans and U.S. allies globally. For example: Multiple assassinations of coalition forces in Iraq, provided weapons and explosives to Shia extremist groups, planned the 20/01/2007 attack in Karbala, Iraq, that killed five U.S. soldiers and wounded three others. As a financier and senior IRGC official, Shahlaei funded and directed the plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States in Washington, D.C. in 2011. He also planned follow-on attacks inside the United States and elsewhere. Had this scheme succeeded, as many as 200 innocent civilians in the United States could have been killed.


GFATF - LLL - Muhammad Javad Rahimi
Name: Muhammad Javad Rahimi aka Zakri

Position: Head of Africa department in unit 400 of Quds Force.


GFATF - LLL - Ali Parhoun
Name: Ali Parhoun aka Shahabi

Position: The highest-ranking field officer in unit 400 of Quds Force in Africa.


Name: Nasser Jafari

Position: Senior commander in unit 400 of Quds Force.


Name: Hassan Kasemi

Position: A Quds Force operative stationed in Syria/Lebanon.

Background: He is involved in a joint project of Quds Force and Hezbollah’s ESO (unit 910) that includes recruiting Pakistani and Afghan proxies to carry out terror attacks.


Name: Mohammad Reza Abolghasemi aka Yunes Eliasi

Position: Position: Senior operative of Quds Force special operations units.

Background: Operates mostly in the Middle East region. Commanded the terror attack in New Delhi, India, 2012 when one Israeli diplomat’s wife was injured from a sticky bomb attached to her car by motorcycle.


Name: Ali Moghtaderi

Position: Operative in unit 400.


Name: Yazdan Mir aka Sardar Bagheri

Position: Head of Unit 840 – Quds Force


Name: Hamid Raza Danshmandi, aka as Raza Amiri

Position: Head of the Europe and the US department in unit 840 of Quds Force.


Name: Mohammad Ali Minaei aka Mohammadi

Position: Head of Unit 840 station in Iraq.

Background: He is also works for unit 400 and he is Hamed Abdollahi ‘s special operations deputy in Iraq.


Name: “Paymen”, real name unknown

Position: Head of Turkey and Caucasus department in unit 840.


GFATF - LLL - Seyed Hedayat Hosseini Fard
Name: Seyed Hedayat Hosseini Fard

Position: Operative in unit 840 in Syria.


Name: Avat Hosseini Far

Position: Facilitator of unit 840 in Turkey, connected with Turkish organized crime.


Name: Shaharam Poursafi aka Mehdi Razai

Position: Operative in unit 840 in the Europe and the US department.

Background: He approached different Iranians that live in the US, to spot and detect “operational information” on senior US government officials. The operation was supposed to be a revenge for the US airstrike that killed Qassem Suleimani.


Name: Mohamad Reza Bigi

Position: Operative in Unit 840 of the Quds.

Background: Force in the Caucasus and Asia Department. In recent years, he has been in contact with terrorist elements and Islamist organizations in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan, and directed a plan that was useful to the Revolutionary Guards to create terrorist attacks in the region.


Name: Rahmat Asadi

Position: An Iranian intelligence operative who served time in prison in Dubai in the past for his part in the abduction and assassination of Abbas Yazdan Panah in 2013, an Iranian-British businessman who was an Iranian oppositionist.

Background: In 2021 he was part of the squad managed by the headquarters of unit 840 of Quds force in Syria and contained Quds force and other intelligence members, Basij members and criminal syndicates. The squad planned to execute terror attacks on western targets in Colombia, US, Bulgaria, Azerbaijan, Kenya and more (none of them succeeded).


Name: Ali Tanhaei

Position: key field officer in unit 840.


Name: Hamid Zara’ati

Position: key field officer in unit 840.


Name: Mohammad Sa’id Izadi

Position: He is a senior Quds Force commander, Head of the “Abu Jihad’s Foreign Operations Unit”, located in Lebanon.

Background: This unit is supervised by Quds Force and operates under Hezbollah. It is managing the coordination with the Palestinian terror groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad.


Name: Behnam Shahariari

Position: Head of unit 190 of Qods Force

Background: Shahariari was the one who pushed forward the capabilities of the unit. He built and directed the infrastructure enabling Quds Force to transfer sensitive weapons from Iran to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria. For this purpose, Shahariari has set up an extensive network of ties for smuggling goods in Syria and Lebanon. This smuggling network is supported by various cover companies that enables large amounts of money to be transferred between the organizations and its senior members.


Name: Alireza Rezvani aka Yasser or Reza Rezavi

Position: Qods Force key figure in Syria. By virtue of his function, he is connected to various people involved in the transfer of weapons from Iran.

Background: Rezvani served in the past in unit 190 of Quds Force, a unit that deals mainly with logistics of weapon and operatives smuggling.
He is in Syria for the last year and helps to Hezbollah to gather an arsenal of weapons in Syria and in Lebanon.


Name: Hamid Fazeli (Mohsen Kafi)

Position: Position: Head of unit 340.

Background: Has a PhD in mechanics from the Sharif University of Technology in Tehran. Prior to his current role he was president of the Iranian Space Agency (ISA). In the recent years, he served also as the president of the Iranian Space Research Institute (ARI).


IRGC’s Intelligence Organization:


Name: Hussein Taeb (1963)

Position: Former Head of IRGC’s Intelligence organization (October 2009 – June 2022), now Special Adviser to IRGC’s commander, Hossein Salami.

Background: Serves in the IRGC since its primary years. Before becoming the Head of Intelligence, he was the commander of the Basij. He is a religious figure and close to Khamenei. Was replaced after several operational failures as he was the mastermind behind them.


Name: Name: Muhammad Kazemi aka Hajj Kazem (1957)

Position: Position: Head of IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (since June 2022, replaced Hussein Taeb).

Background: He serves in the IRGC since 1983.
Before his current position, Kazemi was the Head of “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC” (2009-2022). De
facto, IRGC’s Counter-intelligence branch (part of the security division) is responsible for identifying spies and fighting infiltration in the regime’s security apparatus. Along the years he commanded numerous operations against regime opponents, which gave him the nickname “the spy hunter” among the high ranks of IRGC.
Kazemi is considered the IRGC’s highest official in terms of influence and he takes part at every operative decision the regime is about to take.
The branch works independently and answers directly to Khamenei, therefore Kazemi has close relations with him. IRGC’s “Information and protection Organization” is considered as a supreme security institution.
In 2020 he established new unit – Supervision of the affairs of Revolutionary Guards commanders and officials. The need was born after multiply operational failures due to too much talking among the high command.



Name: Hassan Mohaghegh

Position: Deputy commander to the IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (since 2019)

Background: Mohaghegh served in his early days in the Habib Battalion and was injured, he uses two crutches to this day. Before ascending to the deputyship of the IRGC Intelligence Organization, Mohaghegh was chief of staff of the IRGC’s 27th Division and later became the Head of the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division. In May 2019, the IRGC Intelligence Organization received another boost in stature when it merged with the IRGC’s strategic intelligence division, with Mohaghegh becoming Taeb’s deputy and continues to be Kazami’s deputy today.


Name: Javad Ghafari aka “Butcher of Aleppo”

Position: Head of the Special Operations Division (Division 4000) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (replaced Reza Seraj).

Background: He is one of the senior figures behind the failures of trying to assassinate and kidnap Israelis abroad in the past few months.
Prior to his current role he was the Commander of the Iranian forces in Syria.
He was “expelled” from Syria due to “major breach of Syrian sovereignty”, in fact, the reason was Assad’s request to Ghafari superiors after the last ordered to attack US forces and deployed Iranian weapon in unapproved places in the country. He put Syria in huge risk of opening a war with Israel.
He is considered a problematic figure. This is the main reason he was deployed in the shadows, out of Quds Force regular institutions, as he failed many times in his new role (first as a deputy to Reza Seraj) due to lack of knowledge in special operations.
The failures of the two made Ghafari to take Seraj position. Furthermore, he dismissed a lot of the division’s personnel simultaneously, which left him with unexperienced employees not capable to do their jobs as he wanted them to. Now he works vigorously to steal manpower and capabilities from other Qods Force and IRGC units.


Name: Reza Seraj

Position: Unknown, former Head of the Special Operations Division (Division 4000) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (replaced by his former deputy Javad Ghafari).

Background: He is behind multiply failed attempts to assassinate and kidnap Israelis in the last months in places like Turkey, Cyprus, and UAE.


Name: Rouhollah Bazghandi

Position: Head of Counterespionage Operations in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization (Division 1500).

Background: In parallel, he functions as a deputy to Javad Ghafari. The two know one-another from the time they served in Syria together and Bazghandi was Ghafari Chief of Bureau.
At the last years of Taeb as the Head of IRGC’s Intelligence Organization, unit 1500 transformed its main purpose and became more focused on terror operations. Without the right knowledge and personal to do so, this was a failure as well.
Bazghandi is also behind the last failed attempts to assassinate and kidnap Israelis in Turkey in the past few months.


Name: Hamidreza Nemati

Position: Cyber Division (unit 2000) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization.


Name: Ali Mohebali

Position: Foreign Intelligence Division (unit 800) in IRGC’s Intelligence Organization.


Name: Seyed Salman Sadeghi Azizalo

Position: An operative in IRGC Intelligence Organization, Division 1500.

Background: He is responsible for Terror activity in Eurasia.


Additional, two recent appointments for important positions at IRGC’s modus operandi:


Name: Majid Khademi

Position: Head of “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC” (replaced Muhammad Kazemi in June 2022).

Background: Prior to his current role he was the Head of the Defense Ministry’s Intelligence Security.


Name: Hasan Mashroueifar / Hassan Amami

Position: Commander of the “Vali Amr Protection Corps” – Khamenei’s personal security unit (since June 2022 replaced Ebrahim Jabbari).

Background: Apparently, his shadow name was Hassan Amami, and he was not a known figure to the public before this role. Prior to his current position he was Mohammed Kazemi’s deputy in the counterintelligence branch – “The Information and Protection Organization to the IRGC”.

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